Brief Panel Description
The reform of the Security Council dates back to 1993 when the General Assembly established a special open-ended working group for that purpose.  At the time, it was recognized that reform was necessary in view of the substantial increase in membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the radical changes in international relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  While progress has been held off for nearly 15 years due to entrenched differences over the best way forward, it appears that a series of circumstances may have created an opportunity for progress this year as a result of the initiation of intergovernmental negotiations in March 2009.
 
1. The International Law Weekend provides us with a most welcome opportunity to address the issue of Security Council reform. In expressing my gratitude to the organizers, I would also like to thank our host, the Bar Association of New York City, and in particular the Chair of the Executive Committee, Charles D. Siegal, and the President, John E. Noyes. Allow me to also salute my fellow panelists: Professor Jose’ Alvarez of Columbia University Law School, whose kind words I so appreciate; Professor Joseph E. Schwartzberg, of the University of Minnesota; and my distinguished colleagues, the Permanent Representative of Japan, Ambassador Yukio Takasu; the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone, Ambassador Shekou M. Touray; and the Deputy Representative of the United States, Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff. Finally, my thanks to all of you for coming. 2. The title of this panel and the explanatory note do an excellent job of summarizing the current status of Security Council reform. We have indeed been talking about this issue for fifteen years without reaching a conclusive result because of disagreements over what kind of a reform to promote. Everyone seated on this panel is in favor of reform, and everyone agrees that there is an urgent need for reform. But each of us has a different formula. A reform is still possible, however, but on the condition that specific obstacles be removed. The intergovernmental negotiation that began in New York last February is a great opportunity to do just that. 3. Let us begin at the beginning . . . of the intergovernmental negotiations. In September 2006, on the margins of the opening of the 61st UN General Assembly, President Musharraf of Pakistan and Prime Minister Prodi of Italy hosted an event on the Security Council reform process, attended by representatives from more than a hundred of States from all over the world. The topic was the need to consider intergovernmental negotiations as a way out to end the stalemate into which the debate had fallen. Two years later, in September 2008, the General Assembly decided unanimously to start such negotiations in February of this year. As it is well known, we had concerns on some procedural aspects. But the Open-Ended Working Group has helped to define them between October 2008 and January 2009.
At the source of the stalemate there were opposing viewpoints on reform and the inability of any one proposal to obtain the support of the necessary majority in the General Assembly. In the absence of a prevailing view, the only solution was a compromise. It was in this spirit that Italy and other like-minded Countries entered into the intergovernmental negotiations with a constructive attitude aimed at finding a negotiated solution.
 
4. Throughout the negotiation Italy has asserted its willingness to find compromise solutions. And it has given concrete proof of its commitment to this principle. In 2005, the G4, the African Group, and the Countries associated with the Uniting for Consensus Movement each presented their own platform for Security Council reform.
In April 2009, Colombia and Italy, which are members of UfC, presented a substantially revised new platform for reform. Without entering into the merits of its single proposals (the platform is available on the website of the Permanent Mission of Italy, if you are interested), I can give you a concise summary of its contents. The platform introduces the idea of non-permanent seats whose terms would be longer than the current two years: they could last for between three and five years, or, as an alternative, for two years that are renewable for a maximum of two consecutive terms. It takes an innovative approach to regional representation. It tries to meet the growing demands of small and medium-sized States to be represented on the Council, by reserving new seats for them. It proposes a broad array of measures aimed at innovating working methods, reforming the decision-making mechanisms, and developing the relationships between the Council and the UN’s other main bodies.
The overall aim of these measures is to make the Council more effective and more representative of the world in which we live. This is especially true for our proposals on decision-making mechanisms and working methods. 
Let me give you a list of some simple but illuminating historical facts. In 1945 the UN had 51 Member States. In 1963 – the year of the last and only reform of the Council – it had 113. In 1993 – the year that the current reform exercise began – it had 184. Today there are 192 UN Member States. The exponential increase in the size of the United Nations membership over the past 60 years already demonstrates the urgent need for a more representative Security Council.
There are some equally compelling numbers: to date, 77 Countries – more than one-third of the UN membership – have never been elected to the Security Council; 42 Countries – one-fourth of the membership – are small States, with populations of less than one million. Of these 42, 37 have never been elected to the Security Council, including some small islands whose very survival is at stake due to the effects of climate change, and who are demanding a voice in the Security Council.
Let me turn to the so-called “greats”: there are great powers that aspire to a privileged seat in the Security Council; some are on the rise while others are in decline; the number of emerging powers is gaining critical mass, and in the next decade or so they will be demanding a berth in the Security Council. When that happens, they may find themselves challenging the same powers that aspire to special seats today.
The under-representation of Africa on the Council is one of the most pressing reasons for reform. Africa is the largest regional group. The Security Council spends roughly half its time talking about Africa. The logical conclusion is that Africa should have a larger voice in the Security Council.
In other words, the problem of under-representation in the Security Council goes well beyond the aspirations of four or five Countries; it regards nations and areas of the world that, for a variety of reasons and circumstances, are asking that their voices be heard. The legitimacy of the future Security Council will depend on our success or failure in meeting this need: only if it represents all these realities will the Council truly be more representative, more legitimate, and more effective.
 
5. There is a small group of Countries that aspire to permanent seats in the Security Council. In all frankness, it is hard to understand how this would mark an improvement to the issue of representation. On the contrary, it would undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council, as the examples I have given indicate. What we should be focusing on, instead, is election and rotation mechanisms. Any other option would stymie the legitimate aspirations of UN Member States for a more representative Council. Let there be no mistake here: every Country, region and group has a vital interest in Security Council reform.
 Moreover, talking of reform of the Council only in the “categories” issue (new permanent or non permanent) is absolutely not enough to have a Council that works better and is more representative. The Security Council is a complex machine that functions according to rules and mechanisms that are themselves in need of reform. To enlarge the Council by adding new seats, without tinkering with the machine’s other gears, would simply overburden the machine and therefore impede its efficiency and effectiveness. This is why some basic reforms are needed on basic aspects. This is also why a growing number of States are talking about the need for comprehensive reform.
When the Ambassadors of Colombia and Italy presented the new platform last April, they explained that it was not a take-it-or-leave-it framework resolution. It is instead an effort to include the positions and interests that Member States have expressed in the previous months on the five key issues. It is therefore open to negotiation. In a nutshell, it is an attempt at compromise.
 It is in this same spirit that they indicated their willingness to explore intermediate options. Italy, like other Countries associated with UfC, does not have a definitive position on intermediate proposals. Nevertheless, in the search for possible common ground we have supported the requests of Countries from different groups to explore such options in greater detail. Because we believe that the only way out is to search for compromise solutions.
This brings me to the issue of impediments to progress, which I mentioned at the outset. If we truly wish to move the process forward and find a negotiated solution, everyone will have to make an effort. A negotiation is by definition an exercise in mediation, in finding common ground. The time has come for everyone to work together in this direction. 6. Allow me to conclude by talking about our future prospects. Starting the intergovernmental negotiation was not an easy process. As I have mentioned, there were disagreements over the modalities of the negotiation. But in the end, we were able to find a common road. Not only did the negotiation begin in February without running aground. It also developed over the months that followed, making it possible to examine the key issues quite thoroughly; to our way of seeing, it has enabled us to identify areas of convergence between the different groups: I realize that not everyone on this panel will agree, but to our way of seeing in the negotiation there have been points of contact between the various positions regarding the size of the Council; on the need to review the decision-making mechanisms and working methods; ad on the Council’s interaction with the UN’s other main bodies.
 
What we have to do now is build on what has already been done so far. If everyone makes a sincere and genuine effort to reach a compromise, we could achieve Security Council reform much sooner than many might expect