Mr. Chairman,
 during the second round Italy endorsed the request formulated by colleagues from various groups, both in and outside of UfC, to organize a session dedicated to exploring the intermediate approach. Holding this debate is consistent with the principles we have thus far sought to emphasize, namely:
- negotiation means seeking compromise;
- this negotiation has already turned up points of convergence;
- intermediate solutions could provide the ground for such a compromise.  It is important to understand that – as outlined by the distinguished representative of Egypt – “intermediate” means different things to different people. Exactly as the increase in both categories, as we noticed yesterday, means very different things to different Member States.
 Today’s session is the ideal occasion to allow those Countries that have more openly indicated a leaning toward intermediate solutions to clearly outline their vision.
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 Our approach has no prejudices against intermediate approaches, so long as there is an unambiguous definition of what we are talking about.
 Over the course of the negotiation we have heard various definitions. I would identify at least four different basic ideas: a) a temporal model, namely one with a limited extension in time; b) gradual approaches toward a reform that is later destined to become definitive; c) proposals for a merely partial reform; d) compromise solutions that combine various views of reform.
 In comparison with the discussion we had yesterday, focused selectively and singling out just one of the five issues, we are realizing today the immediate advantage of the intermediate approach: that is to outline a formula which provides a solution, although on a temporary basis, for all the five key issues, in a comprehensive manner. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, let me be more precise on what Italy intends for intermediate solution.
1. We have great reservations about the idea of a temporary reform, that is to say, an interim or transitional approach, if it is in reality aimed at establishing de facto new national permanent seats. For at least two reasons: a) Many of the transitional approaches that we have heard in the past few months seem to be actually aimed at establishing new national permanent members in a deceptive guise. To give a concrete example, we cannot accept a transitory model that provides for seats of a duration that is identical to that of the model itself; or that at any rate contains formulas for re-election that would lead to the same outcome as a permanent seat;
b) Our concern stems also from the vagueness of the so-called review clauses to which the advocates of such approaches refer. The history of the UN Charter review conference, which was never held despite article 109 of the Charter, is an illustrious precedent. The issue of review, which is essential to any intermediate solution, requires a thorough examination. 2. By the same token, intermediate approaches that are actually aimed at promoting partial solutions would also be unacceptable. We reiterated this point on September 1: a piecemeal approach to reform would not lead to a renewed Security Council but rather to something ill defined, less representative, less effective, and more susceptible to major imbalances within the Council. 3. Our interest is instead in a crossroad for different views. A solution that contains elements from the various models that can be shared. In this sense, the platform that we presented last April, together with the distinguished Permanent Representative of Colombia, Ambassador Blum, made an effort in this direction, first and foremost through the proposal to create new seats with longer terms.  To this end I would like to briefly comment the well-known reservations that the African Group has raised to intermediate solutions. We understand the reasons for the African Countries’ objections, which is why we appreciate the fact that they have nevertheless consented to the holding of today’s debate. Italy fully shares Africa’s concern and aspiration to redress the historical injustice of its under representation in the Council. I would like to recall in particular the regional dimension of the African position: it is unique precisely because it is expressed by an entire region, unlike all the other proposals on the table; and to recall the points of contact between this approach and the platform presented by Colombia and Italy in its regional approach to reform.
4. A transitory solution worth of attention is the gradual approach described by some colleagues in recent months. Unlike an interim approach aimed at creating de facto national permanent members, a truly gradual approach will have the virtue of introducing a reform that is sufficiently flexible to be modified or adjusted over time. The conditions are that this model: a) includes from the beginning all the aspects of the negotiation and is not a subterfuge for partial solutions;
b) it will not consist in a de facto creation of new national permanent seats;
c) includes formulas for reviews that: i) cannot be ignored by Member States; ii) have a pre-established mandatory deadline; iii) cover every aspect of the reform. 5. To better understand the sense of today’s discussion, I wish to draw the attention to the eloquent essay written by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein, Ambassador Wenaweser, in the publication dedicated to our friend Ambassador Frank Majoor. And let me take this opportunity to express my warmest welcome to his successor, the distinguished Ambassador Herman Schaper, to whom I wish all best success in his mission.  Ambassador Wenaweser illustrates the history of the intermediate proposal since 2005. I will not enter into the merits of the idea as it was then conceived, and on which we keep various reservations. Its genesis, however, is quite illuminating: given the contrast between incompatible reform models and the objective impossibility that the idea of creating new national permanent seats could even remotely find the necessary consensus – Amb. Wenaweser explains – the facilitators of the time imagined something different: an intermediate solution that could bring together the common ground of otherwise incompatible models.
  This same philosophy, inspired by openness to compromise and flexibility as the only ways out of this process, is at the basis of our willingness to discuss intermediate solutions.
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Mr. Chairman,
 before concluding, I wish to take the opportunity of this final meeting in the third round to request clarification on the follow-up to this negotiation from now to the end of the 63rd General Assembly.
 As we all know, Decision 62/557 provides in its last paragraph that “The Open-Ended Working Group should submit a report to the General Assembly before the end of its 63rd session, including any agreed recommendations.” We would like to ask the Chair for clarification as to how he intends to proceed.
 Let me also take the opportunity of this concluding session of the intergovernmental negotiation to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the important contribution you are giving to this fundamental reform process.
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.