I. The Size of the new Security Council 1. The linkage between size and equitable representation
The size of the Security Council has a direct impact on the issues of representation – of the entire membership and of geographic groups – and effectiveness. Discussion of the numbers on the Council without knowing its characteristics risks therefore being merely academic.
 In 1945 the Security Council had eleven Members – five permanent and six non-permanent – out of a total of 51 Member States in the United Nations. The ratio was of one Council Member per less than five UN Members. This means that – discounting the permanents – fewer than eight countries were competing for each elective seat.
 By the reform that entered into force in 1965, the Council grew to fifteen members out of 117, meaning that there was one elective seat for every 11 States. Since then the United Nations has grown exponentially: there are 75 new Member States, for a total of 192. The Open-Ended Working Group’s Report to the 61st General Assembly, which is quoted in Ambassador Tanin’s letter of 3 April, states that there is now an overall 1 to 13 ratio. If we narrow this calculation to elective seats, however, in the Council there is currently one seat available for every 19 members of the United Nations.
 The possibility today for each Member State to accede to the Council has diminished by approximately 150% since San Francisco Conference.
 If we disaggregate this data by region, other important elements emerge. In the African Group there is one elective seat for every 17 members of the Group. In the Asian Group the proportion is 26 States for every elective seat. The Eastern European Group has 22 Countries to compete for a single seat.
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 In short, the inaccessibility of the Council is a glaring problem that has to be corrected. It overlaps with an equally serious distortion in the representation of the regions. Since the permanent seats do not represent the respective regional groups, there is no regional accountability in the G4 proposal.
 The “great pretenders” are arguing that some Countries have “greater responsibilities” than others, and thus deserve a higher status, despite the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter. But our discussions on the size of an enlarged Council show that there is a much wider group of Countries that consider themselves to have a fundamental responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security. It is very difficult to say which Countries have a greater right than others to permanently sit in the Council. The only way out is therefore to put aside the idea of expansion in permanent national seats and strike a balance that allows all those with greater responsibility to serve in the Security Council.
2.  Models of governance The enlargement of the Security Council will impact its functioning and effectiveness. Adding too many seats would clearly hamper the mechanisms of a collective decision-making organ. The problem is to understand the maximum limit that would assure the right proportion between increased representation and enhanced functionality.
 
Looking at other bodies of global governance, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund consists of 24 Members out of a total 185 Member States. Again in the context of international finance, the Board of Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development consists of 24 Directors out of 185 Member States. When we look at organs of political governance, we see for example that the Board of Governors of IAEA has 35 Member States, out of a total of 146 Members, and requires a two-thirds majority or simple majority for the approval of decisions, depending on the subject matter. The International Civil Aviation Organization has a Council made of 36 out of 190 Member States. The Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization has 49 Members out of 191. Another example is the European Council, consisting of 27 Member States, which makes its decisions on the basis of consensus.
  The examples I have just given represent the numerical range that we have to ponder. In all of these cases, we are dealing with bodies that function despite the fact that they are much larger than the UN Security Council. This is also true for the European Council, a case of decision-making mechanisms, in which the veto reserved for each of the 27 does not prevent effective deliberation.
3. Size of an enlarged Council
Many proposals have been put forward on the question of size of an enlarged Council over the last years. In the past, UfC, as well as the G4 have spoken of 25 seats, with huge differences however in terms of accessibility to the Council. 
 The African Group proposed a 26-member Security Council. One Permanent Member spoke of a “limited” expansion, without precise indications. Finally, the Philippines envisions a 31-member Security Council.
 The Security Council has to be enlarged. Also this, however, should be matter of compromise. Only by expanding the Council through non-permanent seats – which in our proposal are both national and regional – can we match a more equitable geographic representation with increased access to the Council.
II. Working methods Access, transparency, effectiveness, and accountability are the main goals of our reform in the working methods. Allow me to underline how these goals should be translated in new working methods.
Transparency means: 
• Better access, more frequent open meetings;
• Timely availability to non Council members of draft decisions;
• Timely briefings on the matters discussed in the informal consultations and in the subsidiary bodies;
More access implies:
 • Full implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter in the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.
• Interaction of the Council with all interested parties particularly in the decision-making process;
• Timely decisions on the format of meetings to allow the membership enough time to prepare;
   More regional accountability should be reflected in:
• Consultations with regional organizations  and  regional stake holders;
• Provisions to allow regional organizations to attend Security Council meetings on issues of their concern.
Working methods include other important aspects: decision-making mechanisms (we know, for example, that the Small Five have also made proposals on the application of the veto) and the relationship with the General Assembly. But I will respect the request of Ambassador Tanin not to tackle these issues during today’s discussion. We already expressed our views on veto on March 16th, and we will present our position on the relationship with the General Assembly next April 20th.   Conclusion
 While speaking of size and working methods, I have addressed two other key issues: categories and regional representation. Once again we are aiming at a comprehensive package, as the solely possibility of a Security Council with greater legitimacy. Only in this way can we truly aspire to a reform that goes beyond the national ambitions of a few Countries and responds to the greater interest of increased effectiveness in the maintenance of peace and security.