Mr. Chairman, Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you for the leadership you have assured also to this second debate on SC reform. Our debate on veto has shown increasing opportunities of finding a common ground among the different positions. First, as noted by some, the indications drawn by my Foreign Minister at the Rome meeting of 77 Member States seem to have received yesterday and today wide support at least on three critical elements: urgency, comprehensiveness and democratic direction of the reform of the SC. In almost all the statements we have heard, the need was loud and clear to consider the reform of the veto an essential and integral part of an urgent reform of the Council; equally loud and clear was the request to either abolish or severely curb the existing veto and to enlarge the Council on the basis of equal rights, giving effective and equal decision power to regions underrepresented; finally, there was wide understanding that the reform should compress the existing privileges, and avoiding new ones. I am glad to note that these indications coincide with the conclusions also of the Rome meeting.
* * * I am delighted by the free advertising my Country’s proposals received yesterday morning from one of the lode stars of the G4, who dedicated about 28 minutes of his 30-minute speech to my statement! I feel compelled to respond, addressing the following: 1. That Security Council reform, in order to be a true reform, must include specific measures regarding the veto. They must be decided now, not in 10 or 20 years, as he suggested. These measures cover a series of possibilities, ranging from an outright abolition of the veto to other options, such as a rebalancing in favor of regions that are severely underrepresented in the Council. It is thus unfortunate that a heinous term such as “apartheid” slipped into the debate yesterday, reflecting a political culture very far from that of my Country. For my Government a democratic system has to be based on regular elections and on a truly representative decision-making system. It was almost 240 years ago that the expression “no taxation without representation” was coined; much more recently than the Magna Carta (1215), although still apparently beyond the understanding of those who insist not only on convalidating old privileges, but also on the need to create new ones. Quite simply put, a new Security Council of equal States must give fewer exclusive decision-making powers to those who already have them, and more to those that haven’t. 2. The second point, which others have evoked, is that for the first time we are in an assembly of sovereign States that have to rewrite or amend the UN Charter. This Assembly thus has enormous political authority. Every voice has the same weight, whether it be the voice of a Country that is rich or not so rich, big or small, a winner or a loser of World War II. Are we actually willing to renounce this opportunity? Some are making the argument that the General Assembly should not decide a reform that could be opposed by one or more of the P5. But this Assembly has an enormous political power. The negative vote of two permanent members, namely France and the Soviet Union, did not prevent the reform of the Security Council in 1963. The same can happen today, in a reform which addresses the veto issue. 3.  So far no one has given any clear explanation on criteria for permanent membership. The more we ask this question the more we hear a deafening  silence as a reply. But what are these criteria? Are they related to a lack of conflict situations with neighboring Countries or full implementation of UN conventions on terrorism, non proliferation of nuclear weapons, criteria related to the nuclear status, since this is also the common attribute of the P5? In the opinion of those supporting the creation of new permanent members, what are the criteria for permanent membership without the veto? And what are the criteria, instead, for permanent membership with veto?  4. There was an interesting openness to compromise expressed by the  distinguished Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom yesterday. He mentioned the possibility of creating new permanent members with something like a deferred veto. In practice, they would accept the self limitation of not using that privilege. So, along this same line of reasoning, why not extend this concept to all those who now have the privilege of veto? Finally, unless I am mistaken, a lode star of the G4 referred to the positions that I have expressed as an “imperialistic” arrangement of the Security Council. I have to admit that the only “imperialistic” thing I have found in these debates is the tone used by some of the great pretenders. This only increases my concerns about a new Security Council filled with members who are not regularly elected. Thank you, Mr. Chairman