1. Connection between the question of the veto and other aspects of the reform process The debates in the Open-Ended Working Group and in the General Assembly on the veto in the past ten years, the letter circulated by Ambassador Tanin, the studies by numerous think- tanks, and governmental reform platforms all show that the question of the veto is indelibly linked with other aspects of the reform. As became especially clear in the discussions on “categories of membership” on March 4 and 5, a debate on the veto independently of the context in which it is applied ends up being purely academic. I understand perfectly the President’s demands for streamlining in this instance, too, and it is with a constructive spirit that I will use my statement to explore the issues connected to the veto.
One area to which the veto is directly connected is the overall status of permanent membership. According to the UN Charter, it has two characteristics: permanence on the Council and the veto. The five permanent members also share a third peculiarity: the legitimate possession of nuclear weapons.
  The veto also impacts on the Security Council’s efficiency, since it overlaps with the issue of working methods. To be specific, with decision-making mechanisms. The veto has historically been a curb on the Council’s decision-making capacities, at times even paralyzing them. So how can we limit it to assure greater efficiency? And what would be the impact of extending the veto to, say, two, three, or four more Countries? More efficiency or more paralysis?
 On the other hand, what would be the implications of completely abolishing the veto on decision making, democratic representation, and the principle of sovereign equality among States? These are all issues that the veto directly impacts, and that force us to ask some basic questions about equitable representation: - If we leave the veto intact, limited to the current P5, at the same time as we expand the Council, would this improve or worsen equitable representation? Would it give the P5 even more power over the other members of the Council?
- Would an increase in veto-holding seats improve the situation?
- If we are going to confer new vetoes, which regions or types of seats should get them? The veto has been a controversial question ever since the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, threatening to undermine the very existence of the United Nations. Today it could jeopardize not only the reform process and the efficiency of a future Security Council, but also the credibility of our Organization. 2. Security Council decision-making mechanisms and the veto
There was sharp opposition to the veto at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Ultimately it was only accepted as a post-war necessity. There was immediate confusion over its exact meaning and its repercussions on the whole system, on international balances, and on ratification procedures. Some particularly troubling questions were never answered: the question of the “double veto,” by which the P5 had to distinguish between issues of procedure and issues of substance; decisions to accept the candidatures of new UN Member States; and the appointment of the Secretary-General. None of those issues was clearly addressed by the five permanent members in the “San Francisco Declaration.”
The veto strongly impacts the Council’s functioning, regardless of whether or not it is used. I am referring to the so-called “hidden veto”: there is hardly ever a need to resort to the veto, since the very prospect of its use suffices to shape the Council’s consultations and subsequent decisions. The veto not only makes the decision-making mechanism less effective. It can also influence the consultation of the Security Council on international peace and security. So the veto greatly reduces the Council’s efficiency; and makes it much less effective.  3. Different views of the veto
Member States have voiced a variety of opinions on how to reform the veto. Many favor its total elimination, others recognize the “legal impossibility” of amending the Charter. Even within P5 Countries, there are major think-tanks and senior officials that recognize the urgent need for self-imposed limitations. Such limitations would allow the Security Council to deal more efficiently with threats such as genocide, humanitarian crises, and massive human rights violations. The “responsibility to protect”, for instance, would remain an empty promise unless it is linked to a voluntary curb on the veto. A Security Council governed by the majority of its members rather than subject to the veto of a few would be far more effective. Greater equality in the decision-making process would also make the Council much more representative.
Many Member States, starting with the entire African Group, believe that if the P5 are allowed to keep their veto, then it should be extended to the new national or regional permanent members as well.
Oddly enough the G4 has deferred discussion of the veto to a later phase of the reform process, as if it were a secondary matter or a mere embellishment of the “palazzo” rather than a fundamental issue. They selfishly hope to pave the way for a reform that reflects their national interests by supporting an expansion of permanent membership. Veto power is intrinsically linked to permanence. There is no separating the two. Their vagueness about the veto – greater even than their vagueness on enlargement – is nothing short of puzzling. Is the good functioning of the Council so negligible that only national interests deserve to be pursued? How can the G4 reconcile its position with the true will to make the Council more efficient, representative, democratic and reflective of today’s global reality? 
Other countries envisage a series of solutions that may realistically improve the current situation, and hence the Council’s efficiency, by enhancing democratic reform. These are the solutions we believe should be pursued. 4. A more democratic vision
 The veto is a striking violation of principles that Italy, with many other Member States, has supported for years: sovereign equality between States; democracy; representation; efficiency. While it may have been born out of historical necessity, it no longer has any plausible justification in a community of sovereign States governed by the principles of the Charter and strengthened by a series of international norms and practices based on democracy and equality.
 We perfectly understand the calls for an abolition of the veto, especially by the African Group, which favors a complete elimination of the veto for the sake of the sovereign equality of States. As an alternative and on the basis of the same sacrosanct principle, the African Group is requesting the veto as a form of reparation for the profound injustice done to it by the current composition of the Council.
 Italy believes that extending the veto would not redress inequality. It would aggravate it, further gum up the decision-making mechanism, and add new obstacles to the discussion of important peace and security questions. This is why Italy supports the abolition and, as intermediate steps, a gradual limitation of the veto. To abolish the veto is a fundamental aspiration, but it may be unrealistic as things currently stand, simply because any attempt to get rid of it would probably be blocked by the application of a veto, a right guaranteed in the Charter!
  On the other hand, it is more plausible to immediately pursue a limitation of the veto, with the end goal of eliminating it, through a progressive approach. At our debates on March 4 and 5, many delegations spoke about “intermediate” approaches that we are open to discussing, in the framework of an enlargement that includes regional seats with longer terms.
 A reform of the veto could be achieved by gradually narrowing the scope of its application. Application of the veto could be eliminated in the following areas, one-by-one: the “double veto”; the admission of new Member States; humanitarian interventions; and actions under Chapter VI of the Charter. A further possibility would be to require at least two vetoes for a veto to be effective.
 The scope of application could also be limited through changes to the necessary majorities required for an enlarged Security Council to adopt decisions on issues of substance. To help promote the regional dimension, decisions of the Security Council on specific geographic areas could provide that Council members belonging to that region become more relevant in the adoption of Council’s Resolutions. One possibility could be that a Resolution should not be approved if Council members of that region, for instance Africa, express their unanimous negative vote on such a decision.
 We could also envision a scenario in which an explanation of a veto on certain questions has to be provided to both the Security Council and the General Assembly. * * *  From the birth of the United Nations to today, the veto has been used 261 times, and this is just the tip of the iceberg. The truth is that again and again the “hidden veto” has prevented substantial discussions of questions that are crucial to international peace and security. This was the case for at least ten issues frequently on the agenda of the Security Council in the past biennium. There has also been a formal veto in some instances, but more often than a potential veto has impeded the Council from deciding even inserting an item into the agenda. I. This is why today a strong political message should be issued by this Assembly: an appeal first and foremost to the permanent members to accept significant limitations on the veto. A first step in this direction might be to adopt a moratorium, taking effect immediately, with the approval of a comprehensive Security Council reform. We are today part of an Assembly where all Member States need to express their political vision for the Security Council reform. We should therefore overcome legal arguments of the past, that veto power cannot be reformed. II. At the same time, we are ready to negotiate “constitutional engineering” modalities – through a review of the required majority for a decision – that could involve the regional dimension. The adoption of decisions on specific regional crises should be based on no negative vote expressed unanimously by the Council members belonging to that region. Wouldn’t the effectiveness of the Security Council’s action, concerning for instance crisis and peace-keeping operations in Africa, be enhanced by such a requirement? Wouldn’t that provision reinforce the regional ownership, democratic participation and inclusiveness? Wouldn’t that approach encourage the commitment of Member States particularly concerned by Security Council decisions to implement its Resolutions?   III. In the framework of the oft-cited need for an “intermediate approach,” the time has come to reconsider positions on the veto. We believe that a common ground could be found on a reform of the veto also with the G4 and the delegations that sponsored draft resolution L69. If we want the Council to reflect the international reality of 2009 rather than of 1946, you need to embrace the position long put forward by the African Group, the NAM, and UfC: namely, that the veto is obsolete and counterproductive to representation on the Council and to the efficiency and effectiveness of its decisions. This broad mainstream tendency in this Assembly should convince permanent members of the political convenience and of the historical need to scale back their prerogatives and open the way to a modern and credible reform. Should the Assembly as a whole make such a request, it would be an important political accomplishment that could not be ignored. On the other hand, adding new national permanent seats to the Security Council would move against the principles of equality and greater efficiency. To create such a category without the veto, as the G4 model proposes, would also fortify the veto power of the P5 and drive a wedge between Member States, dividing them into different classes. As I said on March 4, there would be first class, consisting of the five permanent members with veto power; second class, made up of new national permanent members without the veto; third class, the non-permanent members; and fourth class, which as the Permanent Representative of Mexico remarked, would be those who have never access to the Security Council. A monstrous Titanic ready to sink at its first voyage. 5. Conclusion
The solutions we propose are open to negotiation. The contribution we are offering is constructive and realistic. We have to recognize that the veto originated in historical necessity, in an international context very unlike today’s, in which, after two world wars, the restoration of international balance was a matter of the utmost urgency. The veto was therefore granted to promote the greater collective interest, not to safeguard purely nationalistic interests.
To speak about the absolute and immediate abolition of the veto may appear unrealistic from a strictly legal point of view. But it would be plausible to identify a clear political objective, to think about a gradual process of curbing the scope of its application, which would benefit the Council’s whole decision-making mechanism.
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“All animals are equal but some are more equal than others.” At least that’s what George Orwell wrote in Animal Farm.
Eight hundred years have gone by since an English monarch first accepted limitations on sovereign power by signing the Magna Charta. The idea of placing restraints on executive power, to promote equality and representation are the cornerstones of many of our Constitutions.
What we want is a more democratic Security Council. A reform that will modernize the Council rather than make it more elitist. A Security Council that works better, not one that amplifies inequality.