Mr. Chairman,
 Allow me to begin by thanking President D’Escoto for his dedication and commitment to the Open-Ended Working Group and to the issue of Security Council reform. I would also like to thank Ambassador Tanin for his tireless efforts to move this process forward and for the excellent way in which he is conducting these discussions.
 As Ambassador Tanin indicated last week, it is our task today to discuss the provisions of the last part of paragraph c) of Decision 62/557 on the presentation of the results of the consultations in the Open-Ended Working Group to the informal plenary session of the General Assembly.
 I would thus like to summarize our discussions of the past two months and try to draw some conclusions. Mine is but a single voice representing one of the various views in the debate, but I believe that we can nevertheless identify some common elements.
 Colleagues in Uniting for Consensus have tried to interpret these discussions with the constructive and proactive spirit that President D’Escoto has so often advocated. We are calling for a pragmatic approach, avoiding steering our discussions down the dead-end street of unrealistic proposals. We have therefore supported a platform that contains some basic principles to govern the procedural aspects of the upcoming intergovernmental negotiations: through the document on principles and procedures presented by Argentina and Spain; and through Canada and Malta’s proposal for a General Assembly decision that sets these principles down clearly for everyone, as a blanket guarantee for everyone: for the UfC Countries; for those that are close to UfC; for the Countries of the African Group; for the G4 and their supporters; for supporters of the small 5; and for those whose positions do not coincide with any of these.
 These principles range from the sovereign equality of States to respect for prerequisites such as the openness of the negotiation, inclusiveness, and transparency. They also make reference to the “single undertaking” principle, which, as I described in detail last week, must be the foundation and absolute guarantee of any negotiation. I have heard my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Ribeiro Viotti, saying a while ago that the principle of “single undertaking” is relevant only for trade negotiations. This is not true. Do we have to assume that Brazil objects to this principle in all the other negotiations where, up to here, this principle has been a guiding element, such as the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (I would like to recall that all other 16 UN Counterterrorism Conventions were negotiated on the basis of the same principle of “single undertaking”) ? And in negotiations such as the NPT or in other disarmament areas? Are these global issues not very relevant for the interest of peace and security, the same area for which we are discussing the Security Council reform?   
 I listened with great interest to the ideas advanced by the G4, which were echoed also today in statements by distinguished colleagues. If I have correctly understood the sense of their contributions, and if I may attempt to summarize them, they argue that Decision 62/557 suffices to define every aspect of the intergovernmental negotiation, including the procedural elements. According to this argument, there is no point in discussing such elements in the OEWG since they have already been clarified by the General Assembly Decision of September 15.
This is how I would summarize what has been said so far. The discussions themselves were much more detailed. We have heard interesting thoughts and proposals on various procedural aspects that I addressed in my statement last week and have no need to repeat. I will limit myself to one point: in the great majority of statements, also by Countries that otherwise have very different visions of the reform process, I was able to note the common need for better understanding on procedure.
Allow me to add some reflections on the positions expressed, particularly by the G4 colleagues. They have chosen not to present any proposal to this Working Group and resuscitated arguments that they made before September 15, the date on which we unanimously adopted Decision 62/557. But we cannot condone their claims for two basic reasons: respect for the actual contents of the Decision, and the will which has been expressed by so many members of this Working Group.
1) With regard to the first – contents of Decision 62/557 –  ever since the Decision was adopted by consensus, after a complex negotiation saved by an agreement reached in extremis on the evening of September 15, 2008, Italy, together with the many Countries who subscribe to the positions of UfC, has consistently confirmed its commitment to respect every single aspect of the Decision. It visibly maps out the path that should lead to the intergovernmental negotiations. By February 1, the President of the OEWG is supposed to present the results of the consultations to an informal plenary of the General Assembly. I commend President D’Escoto for his assessment today. By February 28 the intergovernmental negotiations are supposed to begin. This part of the Decision is unambiguous and that no particular interpretation is required. The intergovernmental negotiations will thus begin by February 28. This is what we agreed to in September, this is what we want, and this is what will happen. Furthermore, according to Decision 62/557 the OEWG is supposed to discuss the procedural aspects, in particular the framework and the modalities for negotiations, “in order to prepare and facilitate” the negotiations. Once again, this is what we agreed to in September, this is what we want, and this is what is happening in these discussions.
I feel bound to the contents of Decision 62/557 as a whole, while trying to implement all the measures of the Decision. Only in this way can the process move forward.
On the contrary, I have heard distinguished colleagues from the G4 stating that discussions of the framework and modalities in the OEWG are useless. If they consider the OEWG a superfluous body that should be eliminated, then why did they agree to adopt Decision 62/557, which assigns a fundamental role to the Working Group, before and during the negotiations as well as at the conclusion of the session of the General Assembly? Why did they accept three whole paragraphs – para. c), f) and g) of the Decision, Mr. President – dedicated entirely to the role of the OEWG? In our recent discussions some G4 colleagues have referred to aspects and proposals for the negotiating process that were not ultimately accepted in the very forum where Decision 62/557 was adopted. Here I wish to recall that during our pre-September 15 discussions, proposals had indeed been made to abolish the OEWG. Some countries suggested that the time had expired for discussions on framework and modalities. But all these proposals – all, I repeat – were rejected after thorough and lengthy discussions. This is why the Working Group continues to exist, thanks to the consensus of all the Member States that find themselves here today to discuss fundamental procedural aspects, in compliance with Decision 62/557.
Some G4 colleagues have claimed that the rules governing the intergovernmental negotiations should be the same as the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. In the event that procedural clarifications are required, they argue that the clarification should be rendered, “as part of the negotiating process in the informal plenary of the General Assembly.” But para. c) of Decision 62/557 establishes that the OEWG must “address the framework and modalities in order to prepare and facilitate the intergovernmental negotiations.” This is a very eloquent mandate, showing that the responsibility lies not with the informal plenary of the General Assembly, Mr. Chairman, but with the OEWG.
 2) The second reason I cannot share the G4’s arguments is my respect for the positions that Member States have the right to express – a right they have unmistakably exercised in the past two months. Many statements made in the Working Group during this period have made explicit a common concern: namely, the need to clarify a few key procedural aspects of intergovernmental negotiations, Mr. President, a demand we cannot ignore.
The United Nations was founded on a basic principle: the equal dignity of Member States. This principle applies to the proposals put forward by Member States – proposals that also deserve equal dignity. If some Member States contest this right, the intergovernmental negotiations will fail even before they begin. And those very States will be responsible for this failure, Mr. Chairman, since they continue to believe that the outcome of negotiations must necessarily fulfill all and only the demands they have been unsuccessfully making for the past fifteen years.
Therefore we support the proposal made by Canada and Malta: in order to give a response, to set down the basic principles for everyone, and to ensure the success of the intergovernmental negotiations.
I thus appeal directly to all the delegations in this room to support our constructive approach, in the spirit of reconciling our differences and uniting the membership to promote the reform as you have called for so many times, the latest on January 19 last.   
With this spirit, I would like to make one last remark concerning the Chairman’s submission of the results of these discussions to the informal plenary of the General Assembly by 1 February, 2009, pursuant to paragraph c) of Decision 62/557. Our expectation is that the outcome will be in the form of a draft General Assembly decision.
Nevertheless, should this not happen, I would like to make a request aimed at guaranteeing an accurate and comprehensive picture of the discussions which have taken place in the past two months. The request is that the “results” of the discussions be submitted in written form, making substantiated reference to the various positions and which I did outline earlier, including the document presented by Argentina and Spain at the meeting of 5 December and the proposal put forward by Canada and Malta at the meeting of 19 December. 
I should insist on this point, Mr. Chairman. There may be different evaluations of the “results” of our consultations. But we have objectively reached substantial progress. Others, arguing from another view could say that we had just few “results”. And some, from a very negative and obstructionist perspective could even say that we had no fallout at all.
The word “result”, Mr. President, according to “The Oxford English Dictionary”, means “the outcome of some action or process”. Every action and every process have, in this sense, a result. This result can be either an agreement, or a more problematic outcome. According to the very same Oxford Dictionary, even a dispute is a result. It is not by chance, Mr. President, that Decision 62/557 refers to the word “results”, rather than “agreement”. We had points of disagreement in our discussions, and this could be part of the result to be reported to the informal plenary of the General Assembly.
There can be little doubt that we made substantial progress on the following points:
1) many Member States requested for procedural clarity for the intergovernmental negotiations;
2) any decision should be comprehensive;
3) we have to seek for a true understanding of the concept of widest political acceptance by Member States;
4) many colleagues, even beyond the UfC boundaries, including permanent members of the Security Council, stated that the mathematical two third majority is well below the threshold valid to take a final decision;
5) during our discussions there has been no ambiguity on the need for the intergovernmental negotiations to be open, inclusive, transparent;
6) the negotiations’ “pillars” must include the sovereign equality among Member States, and the understanding that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly are not enough.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, we have “results”, and we expect that these results will be factually reported to the informal session of the General Assembly.
Mr. Chairman,
As a distinguished colleague from an African Member State stated at our meeting last week, defined objectives are essential to our discussion. If the objective is to open a genuine intergovernmental negotiation process that can lead to a true reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, then it is absolutely indispensable that we at least spell out a few basic procedural issues. The discussions we have held in the Open-Ended Working Group offer us an opportunity to meet this widely-felt need, and they would provide the upcoming negotiation process with standards that are specific and shared – the only true guarantee of success.   
Thank you Mr. Chairman.